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Abstract 
 
Cinema struggles with the representation of inner-speech and thought in a way that is 
less of a problem for literature. Film also destabilises the notion of the narrator, be they 
omniscient, unreliable or first-person. In this article I address the peculiar and highly 
unsuccessful cinematic innovation which we can call the ‘first-person camera’ or ‘first-
person’ film. These are films in which the camera represents not just the point-of-view of 
a character but is meant to be understood as that character. Very few such films have 
been made, and I will concentrate on the way in which speech and thought are 
presented in Lady in the Lake (Robert Montgomery, 1947) and Dark Passage (Delmer 
Daves, 1947). I use Jacques Derrida’s critique of the idea of ‘hearing oneself speak’ and 
phenomenology’s dream of direct experience to explore the generally understood failure 
of such films and conclude by considering the implications of such a technique for a 
homunculus theory of mind. 
 
 
Contributor Note 
 
David Sorfa is a Senior Lecturer in Film Studies at the University of Edinburgh and and is 
editor-in-chief of the journal Film-Philosophy. He has written on Michael Haneke, Jan 
Švankmajer and Czech cinema as well as the philosophy of emotion. He has particular 
interests in film-philosophy, phenomenology, the work of Jacques Derrida and film 
adaptation. 
 
Citation 
 
Sorfa, David. 2019. ‘Seeing Oneself Speak: Speech and Thought in First-Person Cinema’. 
JOMEC Journal 13: ‘Dialogue and Communication in Film’, 104–121. 
https://doi.org/10.18573/jomec.185.  
 
 
Accepted for publication 1st December 2018. 
		
	
 www.cf.ac.uk/jomecjournal         @JOMECjournal 	
104	
Introduction: Showing Thought in 
Cinema 
 
One of the challenges that cinema faces 
is the issue of indicating what a 
character may be thinking. The truism 
here is that literature is able to more 
easily show such thought since a novelist 
is able to explicitly describe what is 
going through a character’s mind, 
whether that is in the first, third or 
possibly even second-person. Thomas 
Leitch identifies this as the sixth fallacy 
in adaptation theory and formulates it 
thus: ‘Novels create more complex 
characters than movies because they 
offer more immediate and complete 
access to characters’ psychological 
states’ (Leitch 2003, 158). Cinema, 
apparently, does not have easy access to 
such novelistic devices and audiences 
either have to infer what a character is 
thinking from the facial expressions of 
actors and the general narrative context 
of the film, or characters can express 
their thoughts through speech. Here the 
options include the expression of 
thoughts during dialogue with other 
characters; the expression of such 
thoughts in a public oration of one sort 
or another, such as the best man’s 
wedding speech, a speech at a political 
rally or address to a judicial court, such 
as Gary Cooper’s infamously long speech 
at the end of The Fountainhead (King 
Vidor, 1949). Film characters can also 
read out their letters or diaries to 
indicate to the audience their particular 
thoughts about various issues (Bridget 
Jones’s Diary [Sharon Maguire, 2001]; 
Badlands [Terrence Malick, 1973]; Diary 
of a Country Priest [Robert Bresson, 
1951] and many others).1 In a version of 
the theatrical monologue, the character 																																																													
1 My thanks to Kyle Barrowman for this 
suggestion.  
 
can address the cinema audience either 
directly, as in Michael Haneke’s Funny 
Games (1997 and 2007), or indirectly by 
literally speaking out loud to him or 
herself. Finally, the filmmakers can 
choose to use a voiceover which can 
either be retrospective, as a character 
recalls the events of the plot and the film 
then re-enacts those events, or the 
voiceover can function as what could be 
technically called ‘internal diegetic 
voiceover’, 2  meaning that the voice we 
hear is supposed to be understood as 
the internal speech of the character on 
screen. 
 
Outside of these possible and literal 
expressions of thought as speech, we 
must remember that the basic elements 
of cinematic expression are also always 
helping us to form hypotheses about 
what any particular character might be 
thinking (see Bordwell 1985, 29–47). 
These include, of course, the basic 
building blocks of film style: mise-en-
scène, cinematography, editing and 
sound. Here I wish to address the 
peculiar and highly unsuccessful 
cinematic innovation which we can call 
the ‘first-person camera’ film. These are 
films in which the camera represents not 
just the momentary point-of-view of a 
character, but films where the camera’s 
view is meant to be understood as the 
literal and subjective view of that 
character more or less throughout the 
duration of that film. While many films 																																																													
2 Richard Raskin outlines a number of terms 
used by various theorists to describe this 
phenomena under the general category of 
“subjective sound”: “Called ‘non-realistic’ by 
Spottiswoode (185), ‘metadiegetic’ by Gorbman 
(450), ‘intradiegetic’ by Branigan (68) and ‘internal 
diegetic’ by Bordwell and Thompson (256), this 
class that I am designating as subjective involves 
sound which occurs in the mind of a given 
character, and which other characters present 
are normally unable to hear” (Raskin 1992, 45). 
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incorporate fleeting point-of-view shots, 
or shots that are ‘restricted’ or ‘focalized’ 
(cf. Branigan 1992, 80) to a single 
character, not many try to make this the 
central stylistic conceit.  
 
Very few such films of feature length 
have been made and I will concentrate 
on the way in which speech, dialogue 
and thought are represented in Lady in 
the Lake (Robert Montgomery, 1947), 
Dark Passage (Delmer Daves, 1947) and 
Hardcore Henry (Ilya Naishuller, 2015).3 
While I pay most attention to Lady in the 
Lake, all of these films offer something 
interesting when trying to show us what 
a character is thinking. I am interested in 
such films because they are anomalous 
and indicate an aesthetic path not 
travelled. In general, cinema likes to 
present dialogue alongside gesture in 
order to overdetermine meaning (the 
literal meanings of words in speech are 
reinforced by gestures associated with 
specific emotions) and one of the 
defining characteristics of first-person 
cinema is that we cannot, for the most 
part, see the character’s body. Thus, we 
have to make judgements about that 
character’s state of mind without the aid 
of embodied cues.4  																																																													
3 Other significant examples include Julian 
Schnabel’s The Diving Bell and the Butterfly (Le 
Scaphandre et le Papillon, 2007) and Gaspar 
Noé’s Enter the Void (2009). 
 
4 In an interesting conclusion to one of his few 
direct discussions of cinema, Maurice Merleau-
Ponty suggests that film’s power derives from its 
ability to give us a direct and external depiction 
of a character’s body in the world: ‘This is why 
the movies can be so gripping in their 
presentation of man: they do not give us his 
thoughts, as novels have done for so long, but his 
conduct or behavior. They directly present to us 
that special way of being in the world, of dealing 
with things and other people, which we can see 
in the sign language of gesture and gaze and 
which clearly defines each person we know' 
Obviously, there are many films that 
employ subjective camera sequences, 
and I will mention some of these, but the 
discussion here is limited to those 
feature films that employ this technique 
completely or, at least, predominately. 
Out of the three films discussed here, it 
is only the most recent, Hardcore Henry 
that employs the device of the first 
person camera from the very beginning 
to the end, excluding only the title 
sequence. Lady in the Lake employs four 
sequences where Phillip Marlowe (Robert 
Montgomery) appears in the third-person 
and directly addresses the audience, 
mainly to explain some development in 
the increasingly absurd plot; while Dark 
Passage uses the first-person camera 
only in the first thirty-five minutes of the 
107 minute long film. There may be 
something to say about Virtual Reality 
cinema, but many of the problems that 
beset the 2D version of first-person 
cinema will replicate absolutely in VR 
cinema and, like 3D, VR will likely 
produce a few novelty examples before 
quietly dying a well-deserved death, only 
to be periodically resurrected in a cycle 
of ten or twenty years. The issue of the 
success or otherwise of the first-person 
camera is not a technological problem 
but a narratological and philosophical 
one. 
 
The main point to take from all this is to 
conclude that the first-person camera 
device just does not work, for whatever 
reasons, in feature length film. The 
analogy with literature and the first-
person novel quickly breaks down since, 
while this form may work in novels, it 
certainly does not seem to do so in 																																																																																								
(Merleau-Ponty 1945/1964, 58). I am thus 
examining those outlier cases where film 
chooses not to follow this general pattern. See 
Daniel Yacavone (2016) for a detailed discussion 
of Merleau-Ponty and film phenomenology, 
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average length films. While novels 
routinely allow us to read the thoughts of 
a character, films that try to show the 
inner speech of their characters seem to 
struggle to do so but, nevertheless, the 
few examples available do highlight 
some fascinating aspects of the 
problems with the representation of 
thought, understood as speech or as 
inner speech, in visual media. 
 
 
The Problem of a Subjective Cinema 
 
The issue of subjectivity in cinema is one 
that has exercised theorists from the 
very beginning of cinema and makes up 
a large part of the thinking around one of 
the first theoretical books about cinema, 
Hugo Münsterberg’s The Photoplay: A 
Psychological Study, published in 1916. 
Münsterberg identifies certain cinematic 
techniques as reflections of ways in 
which the real mind works. Noël Carroll’s 
1988 article in The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism on ‘Film/Mind 
Analogies: The Case of Hugo 
Munsterberg’ investigates this early 
example of film psychology and 
technique in which the close up is 
thought to mimic attention; parallel 
editing functions in the same way as our 
ability to concentrate on and link a 
number of separate events; and 
emotions are reflected by ‘the use of soft 
focus, rhythmical editing and camera 
movement’ (Carroll 1988, 492). For 
Münsterberg, the cinema is a creation of 
human psychology and so its technology 
inevitably reflects the structure of that 
psychology. 
 
Julio L. Moreno’s article ‘Subjective 
Cinema: And the Problem of Film in the 
First Person’ published in 1953 in The 
Quarterly of Film Radio and Television is 
another early engagement with the 
problem of subjectivity in cinema. 
Translated from the Spanish (Moreno 
was an attorney in Uruguay), he begins 
by identifying a trend in the 
contemporary novel towards ‘an 
increasingly objective external 
presentation of the actions of the 
characters and, at same time, toward de-
personalization of the narrative, reducing 
it to a purely impersonal statement of 
the facts’ (Moreno 1953, 341). Moreno 
sees the novel developing in a realist 
mode that eschews the presentation of 
interior life in favour of the observable 
‘facts’. In contrast to this tendency, 
Moreno argues, cinema seemed to him 
to be more and more interested in 
presenting stories subjectively: 
 
We may state that what is new is the 
conscious purpose of creating a 
motion picture narration technique 
modelled on the literary narrative in 
the first person. By thus personalizing 
the telling of a story, the film seeks to 
multiply its formal resources of 
construction and exposition. It 
proposes, as well, to gain another 
advantage of literary narration in the 
first person by increasing the 
identification between reader and 
protagonist. The film seeks to put the 
spectator in the position of a 
participant, involved in the world of the 
narrative, living as his own the 
experiences of the story (Moreno 
1953, 341). 
 
Cinema allows for greater ‘identification’ 
with fictional characters and there is 
increased empathy with the protagonist 
and a more immediate experience of the 
film’s fictional world. Moreno discusses a 
variety of films that occasionally employ 
various techniques of subjective 
presentation, from F.W. Murnau’s The Last 
Laugh (1924), Jean Epstein’s The Fall of 
the House of Usher (1928), Hitchcock’s 
Spellbound (1945), Citizen Kane (1941) 
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and Orson Welles’s planned Heart of 
Darkness in which ‘the camera was to 
occupy Marlow’s place, the action to be 
seen through his eyes’ (Moreno 1953, 
350). Moreno devotes much of his 
detailed analysis to Lady in the Lake and 
outlines the main technical difficulties 
with which the filmmakers had to 
contend. Montgomery used long 
sequences, a swaying camera to indicate 
when Marlowe was walking and ‘actors 
were required to violate one of the first 
rules of their craft: they were made to 
face directly into the camera as they 
spoke their lines’ (350–351). There was 
also the difficulty of filming the hands 
and feet of the detective when they 
came into his supposed line of view. 
Perhaps most interestingly for our 
particular interest in speech: 
 
In the pursuit of realistic detail, even 
Montgomery’s voice was recorded with 
a more muffled tone than his natural 
voice, since this is the way everybody 
hears his own voice (351). 
 
Whether this is true or not is a question 
for a more phenomenologically 
experimental study but suffice it to say 
that when we hear our own voice, usually 
recorded, it seems different to the way in 
which others hear it. There is much more 
to say about Moreno’s article, especially 
his discussion of Jean-Paul Sartre’s The 
Imaginary (1939), but Moreno shows that 
narrative demands a split between the 
narrator and the narrative, between the 
person telling the story and the story 
itself, and that film generally keeps a 
clear distinction between the facts of the 
narrative and the way in which these 
facts are presented to us. First-person 
cinema confuses this distinction and so 
first-person cinema struggles to work 
well because it collapses the narrator 
into the narrative. In first-person cinema 
it is unclear whether what we are seeing 
belongs to the subjective or objective 
world and this unintended ambiguity 
acts against the film. 
 
In France, the engagement with 
subjectivity in cinema was particularly 
addressed by Jean Mitry, Christian Metz 
and Gilles Deleuze. Mitry’s The Aesthetics 
and Psychology of Cinema (published 
originally 1963–1965) was the first book 
to ‘legitimize film aesthetics as an object 
of serious study’ (Brian Lewis’s foreword 
to the English translation 1997, vii) and in 
the sub-section entitled ‘Subjective 
Camera’ (206–214), Mitry suggests that 
the terms ‘personal’ and ‘impersonal’ 
might be better suited to describe 
certain types of shot which allow ‘the 
audience to “take the place” of the 
heroes, to see and feel “as they do”’ (207) 
rather than merely observe the action as 
an ‘invisible audience’ (206). Mitry makes 
the important point that it is ‘impossible 
to represent a mental image, since, 
having become visual, it ceases to be 
mental’ (209) and that when cinema 
presents a ‘subjective viewpoint’, it 
merely gives the audience an ‘aesthetic 
equivalent’ to such thoughts and that 
spectators are only given the ‘impression’ 
that they are ‘seeing or feeling “as 
though” [they] were the character in the 
drama’ (ibid.). In other words, the image 
of thought in cinema is always a 
metaphor. In his discussion of Lady in 
the Lake, Mitry opines that in first-person 
novels the ‘imaginary world is created, 
constructed, by me’ (210, emphasis in 
original) and so is felt subjectively, but 
that in film, the camera ‘conveys 
impressions not generated by me’ (ibid.) 
and the viewer never feels as if they ‘are’ 
that character since, ‘[a]t no point am I 
able to recognize the image of my own 
body’ (ibid., emphasis in original). For 
Mitry, then, film can never present 
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‘subjective experience’ and that any 
attempt to provide this experience 
‘dissolves into a vague and indistinct 
“nonself”’ (211).5 In Cinema 2: The Time-
Image, Deleuze finds a similar 
liquification between the objective and 
the subjective in the ‘cinema of poetry’ 
where: 
 
the distinction between what the 
character saw subjectively and what 
the camera saw objectively vanished, 
not in favour of one or the other, but 
because the camera assumed a 
subjective presence, acquired an 
internal vision, which entered into a 
relation of simulation ('mimesis') with 
the character's way of seeing (Deleuze 
[1985] 1989, 148). 
 
Deleuze’s discussion continues to 
consider the space of ‘free indirect 
discourse’ in cinema but this takes us 
rather beyond the specific case of the 
first-person film. Suffice it to say that 
Deleuze does not find such films of 
particular interest. While Christian Metz 
engaged more fully with various 
techniques of filmmaking and their 
semiotic and psychoanalytic processes, it 
is in his final work Impersonal 
Enunciation, or The Place of Film ([1991] 
2015) in which he addresses the issue of 
subjective image and sound in detail.6  
 
Metz begins by stating that when a 
‘character looks (or listens), he always 
knows, or at least he acquires a kind of 
knowledge that tallies with that looking 																																																													
5 In an extended discussion of Lady in the Lake, 
Catherine Williamson argues that the first-person 
technique “is used to enable the spectator the 
opportunity to step into the diegesis” (1996, 17), 
in fact the film dismantles “conventional 
voyeuristic visual pleasure” by “preventing any 
sort of suture” (18). As in Mitry, the film fails to 
achieve its aim on technical grounds.  
6 Metz lists a number of French language texts on 
this subject in footnotes 2, 3 and 4 (201). 
or that listening’ (90) and this chimes 
with Branigan’s outlining of the 
‘hierarchies of knowledge’ (1992, 72–76) 
that distribute comprehension amongst 
characters and audiences. Metz 
discusses Lady in the Lake explicitly with 
reference to Mitry when he says that, ‘The 
idea is that, in order for the spectator to 
take in what a character is seeing, it is 
necessary for him to see that character 
himself, either just beforehand, just 
afterwards, or in some kind of 
accompanying shot’ (91). Without such a 
shot there is no possibility for ‘suture’, as 
Williamson (1996) also notes. Metz 
summarises this argument by saying 
that, ‘to slip into the gaze (“subjectively”), 
one must know the person (“objectively”)’ 
(90). Like Mitry and Deleuze, Metz does 
not find the first-person film very 
interesting since the technique, for Metz, 
fails on a psychoanalytic view which 
demands that the subject recognise itself 
only in its own reflection and the pure 
first-person film never allows for such a 
reflection. Metz continues by discussing 
Michel Chion’s ‘I-voice’ (voice-over in 
English) and points to an important 
equivocality: 
 
The I-voice presents us with constant 
ambiguity, whose principle is 
paradoxically quite simple: it is the 
voice of a character, but as long as it 
speaks and remains invisible, it blocks 
its absent body from accessing the 
Voice of the film; it substitutes itself for 
that Voice and mixes itself up with 
something that it is not – that is, the 
point of origin of the narration (Metz 
[1991] 2015, 109).  
 
Here Metz identifies a confusion between 
the ‘Voice of the film’, which we can 
understand as the meaning of the film, 
with the voice of a character. It is this 
presentation of voice and speech as 
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inner-speech in film that we will consider 
here. 
 
On this point, we should highlight Paul 
Willemen’s detailed discussion of Boris 
Eikhenbaum’s ‘Problems of Film 
Stylistics’ (1974) in which he analyses the 
problem of ‘internal speech’ in film, and 
Willemen returns to the issue in 
‘Cinematic Discourse: The Problem of 
Inner Speech’ (1994). Willemen’s 
argument is complex but his 
fundamental point appears to be that 
language underpins all meaning, but that 
language needs to be understood in its 
broadest possible way to encompass all 
meaning-making activity. This resembles 
the way in which Jacques Derrida 
understands language as ‘arche-writing’; 
which includes all forms of 
communicating. He writes: 
 
This arche-writing would be at work 
not only in the form and substance of 
graphic expression but also in those of 
nongraphic expression. It would 
constitute not only the pattern uniting 
form to all substance, graphic or 
otherwise, but the movement of the 
sign-function linking a content to an 
expression, whether it be graphic or 
not (Derrida [1967] 1997, 60).  
 
However, leaving that discussion aside 
for the moment, let us move on to 
discuss Derrida and the problem of 
hearing, and possibly seeing, oneself 
speak. 
 
 
Derrida and Auto-Affection 
 
In the collection of work called Speech 
and Phenomena: And Other Essays on 
Husserl’s Theory of Signs ([1967] 1973), 
Derrida carries out a dizzying critique of 
Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological 
project. Derrida concentrates on the 
distinction that Husserl makes between 
indication (Ausdruck) and expression 
(Anzeichen) and he pays particular 
attention to the difficulties and problems 
in translating these terms from German 
to French (notwithstanding the added 
complexity of reading this in an English 
translation). To simplify, Derrida argues 
that Husserl needs to say that speech 
and general communication mostly 
operate as indication, in that they use 
language to convey meaning from one 
person to another. Thus, when I say the 
word ‘Derrida’, I hope to indicate to you 
that I mean the French philosopher who 
wrote Speech and Phenomena. 
Expression, on the other hand, is the 
direct experience of meaning which 
occurs, for Husserl, only in what he calls 
‘soliloquy’ or ‘monologue’, that is, in 
internal speech. But, what is crucial here 
is that this ‘internal speech’ in Husserl is 
not really ‘speech’ but rather that the 
phrase ‘internal speech’ functions as a 
metaphor for our experience of our own 
thought. While we may think that we 
‘speak to ourselves’, that is merely a 
second order representation of thought 
to ourselves. We imagine that we speak 
to ourselves, but, on a first order level, we 
experience our thought directly, which 
means to say that we think without 
speech, or before speech. For Derrida, 
this must be impossible, but it is the 
impossibility on which the whole field of 
phenomenology is grounded: the self-
presence of the self to itself. 
 
If phenomenology is the philosophy of 
experience, the thinking of what it means 
to experience the world, then it must 
mean that experience exists before our 
own experience of the world. That is, the 
world appears to our experience and 
that experience, somehow, pre-exists 
that world. Derrida uses the term ‘auto-
affection’ to describe this ideal 
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functioning of interior experience. He 
says: 
 
As pure auto-affection, the operation 
of hearing oneself speak seems to 
reduce even the inward surface of 
one’s own body; in its phenomenal 
being it seems capable of dispensing 
with this exteriority within interiority, 
this interior space in which our 
experience or image of our own body 
is spread forth. This is why hearing 
oneself speak [s’entendre parler] is 
experienced as an absolutely pure 
auto-affection, occurring in a self-
proximity that would in fact be the 
absolute reduction of space in general 
(Derrida [1967] 1973, 79). 
 
Or to put in another way: ‘Hearing 
oneself speak is not the inwardness of an 
inside that is closed in upon itself; it is 
the irreducible openness in the inside; it 
is the eye and the world within speech’ 
(Derrida [1967] 1973, 86). Derrida points 
to a difficulty in imagining observing our 
own thought which should be impossible 
since it implies a thinking of thought, 
which would quickly lead to an infinite 
regression. Leonard Lawlor glosses this 
argument: 
 
In other words, in the very moment, 
when silently I speak to myself, it must 
be the case that there is a miniscule 
hiatus differentiating me into the 
speaker and into the hearer. There 
must be a hiatus that differentiates me 
from myself, a hiatus or gap without 
which I would not be a hearer as well 
as a speaker. This hiatus also defines 
the trace, a minimal repeatability. And 
this hiatus, this fold of repetition, is 
found in the very moment of hearing-
myself-speak (Lawlor 2014).  
 
The dream of first-person cinema is to 
close the gap between spectator and 
protagonist. Just as Husserl dreams of 
experiencing one’s own experience of 
the world in an absolute and 
unmediated way, so first-person cinema 
dreams that we will inhabit the world of 
the protagonist without any gap between 
self, other or world. We will, to put it 
another way, lose our minds.  
 
The claim is that there is no direct 
experience of the world or of ourselves 
and so the problem with first-person film 
is not that it does not reflect the world in 
a proper way, but, on the contrary, that it 
magnifies the gap that exists at the 
centre of our experience of the world 
and it is a reminder of this anxiety – the 
highlighting of the non-presence at the 
very heart of what we imagine to be our 
presence, our self-presence – that makes 
watching such films a profoundly 
unsettling and, it would appear, 
unpleasurable experience. 
 
 
Lady in the Lake 
 
In his introduction to Branigan’s first 
book (1984), David Bordwell says that 
‘theorists and filmmakers have held tacit 
assumptions about narration’ (x) and that 
it is important to make explicit such 
implicit norms. Referring back to 
Aristotle, Bordwell outlines two explicit 
theories of narration. The first is ‘diegetic’ 
and such theories ‘conceive narration to 
consist either literally or analogically of 
verbal activity: a telling’ (ibid.). The second 
is ‘mimetic’ and these theories ‘conceive 
narration as consisting either literally or 
analogically of the presentation of a 
spectacle: a showing’ (ibid.). Neither of 
these approaches is medium-specific 
since both concern the ‘mode’ of 
presentation, rather than the medium of 
presentation as such. So, a novel could 
‘show’ a story if we understand that novel 
to function something like a play; while a 
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painting could ‘tell’ a story if we 
understood that picture as an analogy to 
‘linguistic transmission’. We could see 
Raymond Chandler’s The Lady in the 
Lake (1944) as a novel that shows rather 
than tells, at least in parts. For instance, 
the opening paragraphs of the novel are 
almost obsessively descriptive: 
 
The Treloar Building was, and is, on 
Olive Street, near Sixth, on the west 
side. The sidewalk in front of it had 
been built of black and white runner 
blocks. They were taking them up now 
to give to the government, and a 
hatless pale man with a face like a 
building superintendent was watching 
the work and looking as if it was 
breaking his heart. I went past him 
through an arcade of speciality shops 
into a vast black and gold lobby. The 
Gillerlain Company was on the seventh 
floor, in front, behind swinging double 
plate-glass doors bound in platinum. 
Their reception-room had Chinese 
rugs, dull silver walls, angular but 
elaborate furniture, sharp shiny bits of 
abstract sculpture on pedestals and a 
tall display in a triangular showcase in 
the corner (Chandler [1944] 2016, 1).  
 
This description continues in equally 
extraordinary detail which may be quite 
surprising in a genre, the detective story, 
which is characterised by its interest in 
plot. However, it is clear that there are 
both ‘mimetic’ and ‘diegetic’ elements in 
the two sentences above and it will be 
useful to try and separate them out in a 
little more detail. The components that 
are shown include the Treloar Building’s 
sidewalk, or pavement; a man without a 
hat; the entrance lobby of the Treloar 
building and its reception-room. The 
‘diegetic’ element is then the fact that 
our narrator walks from outside that 
building into the reception area. It is 
unclear whether the ‘diegetic’ element 
(the movement from outside to inside) is 
‘told’ or ‘shown’, since we are told that ‘I 
went past’ but we are not ‘shown’ the 
figure going past. Obviously, this is 
because the ‘I’ is the one who is doing 
the describing and so it is difficult for us 
to ‘see’ him (and we presume it is a ‘him’, 
this is a Raymond Chandler novel after 
all). But we do know that the character, 
Philip Marlowe as it turns out, is there at 
the intersection of showing and telling.  
 
The film, in contrast, begins with a 
medley of Christmas carols that starts 
playing as soon as we see the MGM lion 
and continues throughout the credits, 
which are presented on Christmas cards 
that are removed one by one to finally 
reveal a handgun. It is at this point that 
the sound of the carols merges into a 
whistle; there is a fade to black, and then 
we see Philip Marlowe (Robert 
Montgomery) in a medium shot, sitting at 
his desk. The film thus begins with an 
objective or impersonal shot of the 
protagonist, presumably to allow for 
subsequent audience ‘suture’. The 
whistling fades out and he starts to 
speak to the camera and to the film 
audience directly: ‘My name is Marlowe. 
Philip Marlowe. Occupation: private 
detective’. He then introduces the plot, 
names the Madison Building (the novel’s 
Treloar Building) and to some extent 
explains the film’s method of narration: 
 
Marlowe: What you've read and what 
you've heard is one thing. The real 
thing is something else. There's only 
one guy who knows that. I know it. […] 
You'll see it just as I saw it. You'll meet 
the people, you'll find the clues… and 
maybe you'll solve it quick, and maybe 
you won’t. You think you will? Okay, 
you're smart. But let me give you a tip. 
You've got to watch them. You've got to 
watch them all the time. Because 
things happen when you least expect 
them. 
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We then dissolve to what we must 
assume is the Madison building and the 
whistling returns. The whistling is crucial 
here since it is the marker that we are in 
Marlowe’s mind rather than merely 
following Marlowe’s point of view in 
Branigan’s sense of restriction. The 
whistling marks an interiority that 
displaces inner speech in the film. 
Marlowe does not talk to himself in a 
way that we might imagine that we do 
when we walk along silently, but the film 
needs to tell us that he is thinking, or 
rather that we are in the position of his 
thought. The whistling is the soundtrack 
to the inner speech that we as 
spectators are providing for Marlowe. 
 
When we realise that we are Philip 
Marlowe walking down the corridor, we 
could expect to hear his inner thoughts 
(and I will use the terms ‘inner speech’ 
and ‘inner thought’ interchangeably here). 
We could imagine some thoughts or 
words7 like: ‘Hmmm, I see three women 
with their backs to me and a man 
walking towards me. Let me check 
whether the door on my left is the one I 
am looking for. No, that’s 919, a stocks 
and bonds office (I wonder what that is, 
is that an accountancy firm or something 
else?). Ah, that must be it in front of me, 
350, Kingsby Publications…’ and so on. 
However, the film does not provide this 
commentary since we are being shown 
all of this and so we do not need to be 
told it as well. However, we must also not 
forget that we are inside Marlowe’s head 																																																													
7 I am not at all sure how we think or speak to 
ourselves in everyday situations – do we 
comment on everything like an odd space 
traveller in our mind? Perhaps we do this 
sometimes, and perhaps at other times we do 
not; or perhaps the metaphor of ‘internal 
dialogue’ breaks down here and our thoughts are 
not really like words at all. I am not certain how 
we could empirically measure something like 
this. 
and so we need the whistling to remind 
us that we are not so much seeing what 
is happening, but rather that we are 
seeing Philip Marlowe see what is 
happening. It is difficult here to judge 
whether this is a mimetic or diegetic 
mode of narration, or a strange 
combination of both.  
 
In returning to Edward Branigan’s Point of 
View in the Cinema (1984), we should 
recall the basic distinction that Branigan 
makes here, and in Narrative 
Comprehension and Film, between 
narrative (crudely, the story, the 
chronological series of events) and 
narration (the way in which those events 
are presented to the audience by the 
film). It is important to stress that 
‘narration’, in Branigan’s scheme, implies 
everything connected to the cinematic 
image and its sound. So, narration 
includes mise-en-scène (and acting, 
depending on whether you choose to 
include acting under mise-en-scène or 
not), editing, cinematography and sound. 
The crucial point is that narrative is 
fundamentally virtual: we are only ever 
reconstructing the virtual narrative from 
the actual narration of that film. Branigan 
(1984) defines this succinctly: ‘narration 
refers not to the story itself, but to the 
knowing of the story’ (2). It may also be 
useful here to use Daniel Yacavone’s 
recent distinction between the ‘world-in’ 
the film and the ‘world-of’ that film. 
Responding to a review of his book Film 
Worlds: A Philosophical Aesthetics of 
Cinema (2015), Yacavone explains this 
distinction thus:  
 
In brief, the world-in a film is its basic 
representational and/or fictional 
world, i.e. what is frequently referred to 
as the diegetic world of a film. […]. 
[T]he world-of is defined throughout as 
the total communicative and 
expressive-affective structure and 
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experience of a film (or its ‘modality,’ if 
one likes) as a presentational, as well 
as representational, reality. As such it 
necessarily encompasses (but without 
contradiction also clearly exceeds) the 
world-in, and also includes various 
integrated and co-present extra- and 
non-diegetic, extra- narrative, formal, 
and stylistic features of the sort which 
are often associated with the artistic 
dimensions of films (Yacavone 2017, 
157–158).  
 
Lady in the Lake and other first-person 
films have a very distinct and distracting 
world-of that makes it difficult to engage 
with the world-in of that film, even 
though the subjective camera is 
obviously intended not as a technique of 
distanciation but rather as one of 
immersion. In Branigan’s terms, the 
narration in such films tends to 
overwhelm the narrative and thus fails in 
the intention of doing the opposite. The 
aim of providing a fully immersive 
experience is one that has always 
fascinated filmmakers although technical 
solutions seem less successful than 
straightforwardly narrative ones. 
 
 
The Subjective Camera in 1946 
 
Writing in American Cinematographer in 
1946, Herbert A. Lightman explores the 
‘subjective camera’ in Hollywood cinema 
and says that the camera has a ‘point of 
view’ and that ‘the audience will see the 
story only as the camera sees it’ ([1946] 
1973, 61). He writes further: 
 
Usually the camera maintains the role 
of a detached observer of the story. 
[…] Occasionally, however, the camera 
steps out of its role as casual observer 
and becomes a participant in the 
story. In so doing, it assumes the point 
of view of one of the characters, and 
what appears on the screen is what 
that particular character sees in a 
certain filmic situation. Thus, the 
camera becomes his “eye,” and when 
this is the case we say that the 
camera is subjective (61–62).  
 
Even in 1946, Lightman acknowledges 
that the ‘technique, in itself, is not 
entirely new’ and that, with new 
technology, it is now ‘dynamic without 
being clumsy’. He claims that the 
‘psychological effect of this device on the 
audience is direct and potent’ and that it 
allows the audience to ‘participate 
subconsciously in the action that is 
taking place on screen’ (62). Such 
pseudo, – or folk-psychology is quite 
familiar: ‘The audience is allowed to see 
part of the action as it appears to one of 
the characters’ and it will subconsciously 
experience the same reactions he does’ 
(ibid.). Clearly this was not really the case 
with Lady in the Lake, although, it must 
be said, that contemporary reviews were 
far more generous than the film’s 
subsequent reception. Variety, for 
instance, thought: 
 
Lady in the Lake institutes a novel 
method of telling the story, in which 
the camera itself is the protagonist, 
playing the lead role from the 
subjective viewpoint of star Robert 
Montgomery. Idea comes off 
excellently, transferring what otherwise 
would have been a fair whodunit into 
socko screen fare (31 December, 
1946).  
 
In Britain, the Monthly Film Bulletin 
explains that the camera lens ‘becomes 
the eyes both of Marlowe and the 
audiences and Marlowe is not seen 
unless reflected in a mirror’ (1947, 5) and 
that, finally: 
 
This is a good thriller, whose first 
person camera technique is effective, 
though a little tiring; but has the 
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drawback that we see so little of 
Montgomery, a deprivation to his 
admirers, even though they hear his 
voice and admire his directorial skill. 
[…] The film is richly garnished with 
Chandler wisecracks and should be 
much enjoyed by his and all thriller 
fans (6). 
 
We do hear quite a lot of Montgomery as 
Philip Marlowe throughout the film, but 
his voice seems oddly strained and his 
laugh, in particular, is very odd indeed as 
if the actor were trying too hard to inject 
some personality into the role. 
Nevertheless, it is significant that the 
Monthly Film Bulletin pays so much 
attention to Montgomery’s voice and to 
the dialogue in the film, since there is 
very little else on which to focus.  
 
Here, we may venture to say that one of 
the reasons that Lady in the Lake does 
not succeed emotionally is to bring in 
another form of contemporary pop-
science, that of the mirror-neuron. In this 
hypothesis, whenever we watch a human 
action, the same area in our brains that 
would ‘light up’ if we were doing that 
action ourselves, ‘lights up’ at the sight of 
that action. Thus, when we see someone 
wave their hand, the ‘hand waving’ 
portion of our brain is activated (and 
presumably runs ‘off-line’), and that when 
we see a human face expressing obvious 
emotion, our brains react in the same 
way as if we were experiencing that 
emotion ourselves (see Shaw [2016] for a 
fuller discussion). I remain agnostic as to 
whether this mirror-neuron hypothesis is 
of any scientific explanatory value, but 
assuming that it is, we could argue that 
in cinema it is very important to see 
character’s faces in order for us to 
experience the appropriate emotions as 
expressed by that actor’s face. Since we 
hardly ever see Montgomery/Marlowe, 
we do not really know what we are 
supposed to be feeling in response to 
the brute visual reality of the scene. 
Perhaps it does not help that Audrey 
Totter as Adrienne Fromsett, has such a 
peculiarly inexpressive face. It is 
extremely difficult to gauge what sort of 
emotion she may or may not be 
experiencing during any particular scene. 
The pop-cognitivist hypothesis would 
then be that in order to experience the 
proper emotional response, and even 
Lighfoot in 1946 acknowledges that the 
‘modern photoplay appeals principally to 
the emotions’ (62), we have to see the 
actors’ faces in order not only to 
understand what emotions they are 
experiencing but also in order to 
experience those emotions, as quasi-
emotions, ourselves. There are of course 
numerous problems with this hypothesis, 
including questions of cultural and 
historical specificity which question 
whether all audiences at all times will 
have similar responses to particular films 
or facial expressions, but it may be 
relevant to explaining the lack of 
emotional success in entirely subjective 
films. Dialogue is just not enough in such 
cases. 
 
Foreshadowing a point that Branigan 
makes in his discussion of Lady in the 
Lake (although in more technical 
semiotic vocabulary), Lightfoot argues 
that a ‘subjective scene cannot simply be 
tossed into a sequence at any point. It 
must be motivated by, and definitely 
linked to, the objective scenes that 
precede and follow it’ (63). Clearly this is 
a real problem for Lady in the Lake, since 
there are very few objective scenes apart 
from the framing narrative ones in which 
Marlowe addresses the audience directly. 
Lightfoot discusses Alfred Hitchcock’s 
subjective camera in Lifeboat (1944) and 
Spellbound (1945), since Hitchcock is 
particularly fond of the subjective 
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camera even in his early silent films 
Champagne (1928) and The Ring (1927), 
for instance, or in more famous 
sequences, such as Cary Grant’s drunken 
drive in North by Northwest (1959). But, 
however experimental Hitchcock was, he 
never tried an entirely subjective 
approach like Lady in the Lake, although 
we could consider his apparently single 
take Rope (1948) as an exercise in 
supreme objectivity. 
 
Lightfoot ends by saying that he himself 
has written a ‘screenplay for a two-reel 
short subject which is entirely subjective’ 
(66), which was never made, but he does 
say: ‘It is, of course, self-evident that such 
a film could only be placed on the 
screen as a novelty short. A feature-
length film done entirely with this 
approach would become monotonous’ 
(ibid.). Judging by the lack of any 
consistent use of the first-person camera 
technique in feature films, it would 
appear that Lightfoot was correct. 
 
 
The Face in the Mirror 
 
One of the ways in which Lady in the 
Lake tries to break with the monotony of 
the first-person point of view is in the 
four times that Marlowe looks into 
mirrors during the film (Figures 1–4). 
 
Figure 1: Lady in the Lake: Philip Marlowe 
(Robert Montgomery) sees himself and 
Adrienne Fromsett (Audrey Trotter) in her 
office mirror. 
 
Figure 2: Lady in the Lake.  
 
 
Figure 3: Lady in the Lake.  
 
 
Figure 4: Lady in the Lake 
 
There may be quite a lot to be said 
about mirrors and mirror images in the 
cinema (even without getting into the 
various permutations of film theory’s 
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engagement with Lacan’s rather fanciful 
discussion of the supposed 
psychological mirror stage that children 
apparently experience), but I would like 
to mention Umberto Eco’s discussion of 
the ‘catoptric [mirror] experience’ in the 
final chapter of his Semiotics and the 
Philosophy of Language in which he 
writes that: 
 
But you should not forget that the 
mirror image is not the double of its 
object, but, rather, a double of the 
stimulating field one could have 
access to if one looked at the object 
instead of looking at its mirror image. 
[…] And it is precisely from this 
experience of the absolute that the 
dream of a sign having the same 
characteristics arises. This is why men 
[sic] draw (and produce the signs 
which are precisely defined as iconic): 
they draw to achieve without mirrors 
what mirrors allow them to achieve 
(Eco 1984, 210).  
 
Eco takes the term ‘iconic’ from C.S. 
Peirce’s tripartite taxonomy of the sign: 
index (sign as imprint of reality, as in a 
footprint), icon (sign as resemblance, as 
in a painted portrait) and symbol (sign as 
arbitrary, as in the words of a language) 
(see Chandler 2007, 36–37) and the 
mirror image, for Eco, represents the 
dream of absolute resemblance. Thus, 
the image of Marlowe in the mirror acts 
as a reminder that the film audience is 
not in some third-person position, but 
that the image we see is a direct 
depiction of the diegetic world as 
experienced by Marlowe. In an ideal 
situation, the viewer would take the 
image as an index rather than an icon, 
since, if we were to lose our minds and 
imagine that we were Marlowe, then the 
image would be a direct impression of 
the fictive real, but, as subsequent 
spectators seem to have agreed, this 
dream of indexicality always collapses 
into iconicity. We always know that what 
we see is not an imprint of a real world, 
but always a portrait of a fictional one. 
The image of the mirror is similarly 
important in Delmer Daves’s Dark 
Passage (1947). 
 
 
Speech and Silence in Dark Passage 
 
In Dark Passage (Delmer Daves, 1947), 
which was released just after Lady in the 
Lake, Vincent Parry (Humphrey Bogart) 
begins in the first-person camera 
position for the first 36 minutes or so, 
until the escaped convict organises 
surprisingly effective, illegal facial 
reconstruction surgery. Bosley Crowther, 
writing in the New York Times, complains 
that the first-person device interferes 
with the audience’s desire to see the 
main actor: 
 
Mr. Daves has also confused things by 
using a subjective camera at the start, 
so that it sees things as through the 
eyes of a fugitive, and then has 
switched to the conventional use later 
on. This technique withholds Mr. 
Bogart from the audience's 
observation for some time – until a 
fast job of plastic surgery has 
supposedly been performed on his 
face. When he finally does come 
before the camera, he seems 
uncommonly chastened and reserved, 
a state in which Mr. Bogart does not 
appear at his theatrical best. However, 
the mood of his performance is 
compensated somewhat by that of 
Miss Bacall, who generates quite a lot 
of pressure as a sharp-eyed, knows-
what-she-wants girl (Crowther 1947).  
 
Vincent can speak to others and to 
himself in voice-over until the face 
surgery but is then silent while his face is 
bandaged. He begins to talk as soon as 
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Irene Jansen (Lauren Bacall) removes the 
bandages. Silence marks the space of 
transition between one identity and the 
next. He says: ‘Well? Is it that bad?’ and 
rushes over to the mirror before listing 
all the things that are still the same. Of 
course, we know that he is now 
Humphrey Bogart and the film settles 
down into a rather more straightforward 
style, although the issue of identity and 
the way in which it is linked to the face 
remains central. In an earlier sequence, 
the taxi driver (Tom D’Andrea) who then 
goes on to help him organise the facial 
surgery, says to Vincent: ‘It's funny. From 
faces I can tell what people think, what 
they do… sometimes even who they are. 
You, for instance, you're a guy with plenty 
of trouble’. Meaning lives on the surface 
of appearance and speech is not to be 
trusted. In the final scene of the film, 
Vincent has escaped to the town of Pieta 
in Peru and waits in a cafe for Irene to 
arrive. She finally appears and Irene asks 
the band to play their song, which 
Vincent recognises before seeing her. 
They then dance together in silence. 
Dark Passage gives us a parable about 
appearance and truth, and that the two 
are not necessarily connected.8  																																																													
8 The problem of speech and silence appears 
very clearly in the first-person film’s most recent 
exemplar, Hardcore Henry (Ilya Naishuller, 2015). 
This film adheres most closely to the logic of the 
first-person camera device and, while it is clearly 
modelled on the action of first-person shooter 
video games, the film explicitly deals with the 
problem of silence and of speech in a quite a 
novel way. Henry, whose face we never see even 
in reflection, wakes up in a disoriented state and 
he is told that he has been brought back from 
the dead and given a new body but that his voice 
protocol still needs to be activated. Before this 
can happen, armed villains disrupt the process 
and Henry has to flee. Henry does not speak at 
all for the rest of the film. Hardcore Henry is 
perhaps problematically gleefully in its 
celebration of fantasy violence and underpinned 
by a rather unpleasant misogyny, but it is 
Conclusion: The Problem of the 
Homunculus 
 
If a first-person camera character speaks, 
and if we are immersed in their 
subjectivity, then these expressed 
thoughts invade and take over ours. 
Speech functions as an infection 
supplanting our own thoughts. Ideally, 
the first-person camera acts as a 
parasite, but one that, like the cuckoo, 
forces out the proper thoughts that are 
our own. This may be why these films 
tend towards silence rather than trying to 
present inner speech. They are afraid of 
scaring their audiences by speaking for 
them; speaking in their stead and in their 
minds.  
 
This is a rather melodramatic way of 
putting what is sometimes called the 
‘homunculus’ problem in the philosophy 
of mind. Here we imagine that in our 
brains, there exists a small version of our 
selves: the homunculus, which drives the 
body just as Ripley controls the 
exoskeleton in Aliens (James Cameron, 
1986) or as Remy the Rat learns to 
control the hapless chef Alfredo Linguini 
in Ratatouille (Brad Bird, 2007) (Figure 5). 
The problem is that this homunculus 
must itself have another homunculus 
within its mind, driving it. So, Ripley 
drives the exoskeleton, but Ripley’s mini-
Ripley drives her, and her mini-Ripley 
must have a mini-mini-Ripley to drive 
her, and so on ad infinitum. In Ratatouille, 
Remy controls Alfred, Remy 2 controls 
Remy, Remy 3 controls Remy 2, and so 
we have to imagine an infinite number of 
Remys (see Cottingham, [1987] 2004). 
 
																																																																																								
surprisingly gripping in a way that Lady in the 
Lake never is. Perhaps less speech is more in the 
subjective film. 	
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Figure 5: Ratatouille.  
 
First-person cinema tries to insert us as 
homunculi in the mind of another but 
this particular device either fails because 
the homunculus theory is logically flawed 
at the outset, or because it reveals the 
unwelcome truth that we do not really 
know what or who we are when we think 
or talk. The first-person conceit therefore 
highlights a problem that Derrida finds at 
the centre of Western philosophy as 
such. In the final essay of Speech and 
Phenomena, Derrida writes:  
 
The history of metaphysics therefore 
can be expressed as the unfolding of 
the structure or schema of an 
absolute will-to hear-oneself-speak. 
This history is closed when this infinite 
absolute appears to itself in its own 
death. A voice without difference, a 
voice without writing, is at once 
absolutely alive and absolutely dead 
(Derrida [1967] 1973, 102, emphasis in 
original).  
 
In first-person cinema, we are shown the 
fantasy of hearing-oneself-speak but are 
simultaneously taught that this is indeed 
a fantasy and that one can only hear 
oneself speak in the mirror of language. 
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